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With a simple attack and repair evolution model, we investigate the stability and structural
changes of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs (RG) and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free (SF) networks. We
introduce a new quantity, invulnerability I(s), to describe the stability of the system. We find that
both RG and SF networks can evolve to a stationary state. The stationary value Ic has a power-
law dependence on the repair probability pre. We also analyze the effects of the repair strategy
to the attack tolerance of the networks. We observe that there is a threshold, (kmax)c, for the
maximum degree. The maximum degree kmax at time s will be no smaller than (kmax)c. We give
further information on the evolution of the networks by comparing the changes of the topological
parameters, such as degree distribution P (k), average degree 〈k〉, shortest path length L, clustering
coefficient C, assortativity r, under the initial and stationary states.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the systems in the real world can be repre-
sented as complex networks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], in
which the nodes are the elementary components of the
system and the edges connect pair of nodes that mutually
interact exchanging information. The existing empirical
and theoretical results indicate that complex networks
can be divided into two major classes based on their de-
gree distribution P (k) [10]. The degree of a node is the
number of links adjacent to the node and the degree dis-
tribution gives the probability that a node in the network
is connected to k other nodes. The first class of networks
is characterized by Poisson degree distribution, such as
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi random graph [11]. It is constructed
starting from an initial condition of N nodes and then
adding links with connection probability p. The second
class of networks is characterized by power-law degree
distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ , such as Baraba´si and Albert
scale-free network [12]. It starts from an initial condition
ofm0 nodes and then, for each time step, evolves adding a
new node with m edges (growth) that is connected more
likely to nodes with higher degree (preferential attach-
ment).
Recently enormous interest has been devoted to study
the robustness of complex networks under random fail-
ures or intentional attacks [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. By
random failure we mean the removal of randomly selected
network nodes and their edges. Instead, we call inten-
tional attack the targeted removal of the most important
nodes and their edges. The importance of a node can
be determined by the degree, or the betweenness (the
number of shortest paths that pass through the node),
etc.
In this paper, the node with highest degree suffers at-
tack. Since this node has highest connections to other
nodes, it is most likely attacked and is the most vul-
nerable site in the network. The aim of this paper is
to investigate and compare the stability of Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi random graph and Baraba´si and Albert scale-free
network under the attack and repair strategy. At the
same time, we will compare the effects of the attack and
repair strategy to these two different topological struc-
tures. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the evolution model of the attack and re-
pair strategy. Simulation results are in the next section.
In the conclusion, we formulate the main results of the
paper.
II. THE ATTACK AND REPAIR STRATEGY
Our attack and repair strategy is simulated as follows.
We start by constructing a network according to the
algorithms of Erdo˝s and Re´nyi random graph (RG) or
Baraba´si and Albert scale-free network (SF). In RG, the
network size is N and the connection probability is p. In
SF networks, the initial m0 and m are both 2. The dy-
namics of our model is defined in terms of the following
two operations.
(i) Attack : Find a node with the maximum degree
kmax and remove all its links. (If several nodes
happen to have the same highest degree of connec-
tion, we randomly choose one of them.)
(ii) Repair : Reconnect this node with the other nodes
in the network with probability pre. We assume
that all information on the former links of the dam-
aged nodes has been lost, the damaged nodes have
be connected randomly to other nodes in the net-
work again.
Then, the evolution comes into the next Monte Carlo
time step. An issue should be mentioned here. Unlike
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FIG. 1: Plots of kmax versus time step s with size N = 10000
and pre = 0.005 for (a) random graphs; (b) scale-free net-
works.
previous attack model [12] the nodes damaged will not
be removed from the network, instead they will be recon-
nected in certain way. In this way, we keep the size of
the system constant.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We have performed extensive numerical simulations to
study the evolution of RG and SF networks under the
attack and repair strategy. In Fig. 1, we give a snapshot
of the maximum degree kmax versus time step s with
N = 10000 nodes and repair probability pre = 0.005. We
find that kmax of RG model decreases slowly with big
fluctuations during the evolution. For SF model, kmax
decreases steeply at the beginning of the evolution and
then slowly later. This behavior is rooted in their dif-
ferent topological structures. The RG network is a ho-
mogenous network and all nodes have approximately the
same number of links. Thus the removal of each node
causes the same amount of damage. The SF networks is
an extremely inhomogeneous network, in which the mi-
nority of nodes have most of the links. The removal of
these ’important’ nodes will have dramatic impact on the
changes of kmax.
Generally, the systems with larger kmax have higher
probability to be attacked. In order to evaluate the prob-
ability that the system is vulnerable, we introduce the
concept, invulnerability, I(s). Considering an evolution
of network with maximum degrees kmax(1), kmax(2),...,
kmax(s), invulnerability I(s) at time s is defined as
I(s) = 1/Min{kmax(i)} for i ≤ s , (1)
According to Eq. (1), I(s) is a non-decreasing parameter,
and helps filter out some fluctuations in kmax.
In Fig. 2 we plot the evolution of I(s) versus s for RG
and SF networks under N = 10000 and pre = 0.005. We
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FIG. 2: Plots of I(s) versus step s with N = 10000 and
pre = 0.005 for (a) random graphs; (b) scale-free networks.
observe that in both networks I(s) increases very quickly
at small s but slowly at large s and finally reaches a
stationary value Ic after taking a long transient period.
The stationary value Ic of the RG network is 0.037, while
Ic of the SF network is 0.042.
Additionally, we can see from Eq. (1) that the maxi-
mum degree kmax of the network in the stationary state
is
(kmax)c =
1
Ic
. (2)
Since stationary value Ic is the maximum of all the I(s),
kmax at time s will be no smaller than (kmax)c, that
is, kmax(s) ≥ (kmax)c. For instance, under N = 10000
and pre = 0.005, the repair strategy ensures the maxi-
mum degree kmax of the RG network is no smaller than
1/Ic = 1/0.037 = 27 and the kmax of the SF network is
no smaller than 1/Ic = 1/0.042 = 24. The introduction
of the repair strategy ensures that kmax of the attacked
RG and SF networks are greater than 27 and 24 during
the evolution, respectively. If without the repair strategy,
all the links will be removed after about 5000 time steps
for attacked RG model, 2000 time steps for attacked SF
model.
In order to understand the effects of the repair strategy
to the stationary state of the system, we plot the station-
ary value Ic as a function of the repair probability pre in
log-log scale for RG networks (open symbols) and SF net-
works (filled symbols) with different network sizes. Tri-
angles, diamonds and circles represent N = 2000, 3000
and 5000, respectively. We find that under fixed net-
work size N , the higher the repair probability pre is, the
smaller the stationary value Ic is. On the other hand,
under the fixed pre, the larger N is, the smaller Ic is. In
fact, Ic has an inverse ratio to the product of N and pre.
Figure 2 also tells that the stationary value Ic has a
power-law dependence on the repair probability pre,
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FIG. 3: Plot of Ic versus repair probability pre with network
size N = 2000 (triangles); 3000 (squares); and 5000 (circles)
for RG and SF networks.
Ic ∼ p
−τ
re . (3)
Under the same network size N and repair probability
pre, the stationary values Ic of RG and SF networks are
very similar, with Ic of SF networks a little larger, thus
more invulnerable.
By investigating the changes of the topological param-
eters of RG and SF networks at the initial and stationary
states, we are trying to understand the effects of the re-
pair strategy to the topological structures of these two
different structural networks.
Degree distribution. Figure 4(a) and 4(b) display the
degree distributions P (k) of RG and SF networks in
the initial and stationary states under N = 5000 and
pre = 0.02. Figure 4(a) and 4(b) show that the shape
of the degree distributions is almost the same for RG
and SF networks in initial and stationary states. For RG
networks, the degree distributions in the initial and sta-
tionary state are both Gaussian distributions, with the
peak changes from 100 in the initial state to 38 in the
stationary one. At the same time, the distribution of
SF networks in the initial and stationary states are both
power-law distribution, having the same exponent about
2.6. Figure 4 suggests that the general structures of the
systems do not change even after a long time evolution
to the stationary states.
Average degree. We find that the average degree of
RG network in the stationary state 〈k〉 decreases dra-
matically, while slightly for SF networks. This result is
caused by the homogeneity of RG networks. Since in RG
networks all nodes have approximately the same num-
ber of links, majority of nodes in the network will be
impacted by the attacks and, hence, the rapid decrease
of 〈k〉. The power-law topology of SF networks displays
that 〈k〉 is mainly determined by the nodes with small
degrees, which are less influenced by attacks.
Shortest path length. The shortest path length L is
the average length of the shortest paths between any two
nodes in the network. L in the stationary states for RG
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FIG. 4: A comparison of degree distributions under N =
5000 and pre = 0.02 in initial (circles) and stationary (pluses)
states for (a) random graphs; and (b) scale-free networks.
Solid lines are the fit curves.
and SF networks both increases. That is, the efficiency
for the nodes in the network to communicate decreases
under the attacks.
Clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient of
node i is defined as the existing numbers ni among
the links of node i over all the possible links, that is,
Ci = ni/[ki(ki − 1)/2]. The clustering coefficient of the
whole network is the average over all the Ci. The increase
of clustering coefficient for RG networks in the stationary
states means the nodes have the tendency to be highly
clustered. In fact, the small shortest path length and
large clustering coefficient suggest the RG network in the
stationary states is more or less a small-world network.
The clustering coefficient of SF networks decreases a lit-
tle in the stationary states. It seems that few nodes with
largest connections are attacked and have a big affect on
the network, which makes the connections in the network
becomes sparse, thus the clustering coefficient becomes
decrease.
Assortativity. The assortativity r in the range −1 ≤
r ≤ 1 is another interesting feature of complex networks.
A network is said to show assortative, r > 0, if the
high-degree nodes in the network preferentially connect
to other high-degree nodes. By contrast, a network is
disassortative, r < 0, if the high-degree nodes tend to
connect to other low-degree nodes. The increase of r
for RG networks in the stationary states are consistent
with our conjecture that the networks becomes a little
highly clustered. For SF networks, they are inhomoge-
neous in both initial and stationary states according to
the analysis of the degree distribution above, so r are
both negative, that is disassortative.
4TABLE I: Comparison of topological changes in initial and
stationary states between RG and SF networks under N =
5000 and pre = 0.02.
RG SF
initial stationary initial stationary
Ic — 0.0149 — 0.0152
〈k〉 100.06 38.09 3.99 3.92
L 2.11 3.89 4.83 5.28
C 0.02 0.47 0.0068 0.0028
r 0.23 0.52 -0.062 -0.074
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Summarily, in this paper we study the effects of the
repair strategy to the attacked ER random graph model
and BA scale-free model. We find the introduction of the
repair strategy has significant effects on the attack toler-
ance of the networks. We also introduce a new quality,
invulnerability I(s), to describe the stability of the net-
works. After a long time evolution, the invulnerability
of ER random graph model and BA scale-free model can
both evolve to a stationary value Ic. Ic has a power-law
dependence on the repair probability pre. In addition, the
maximum degree in the stationary state (kmax)c is always
smaller than the maximum degree at time s, kmax(s).
We give further information on the evolution of the
networks by comparing the changes of the topological
parameters, such as degree distribution P (k), average de-
gree 〈k〉, shortest path length L, clustering coefficient C
and assortativity r, between the initial and stationary
states. We conclude that the topological structure of SF
networks does not change during the evolution, while RG
networks become small-world networks during the evo-
lution, according to the small shortest path length and
large clustering coefficient.
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